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WHEREFORE ART THOU ROMEO: 
REVITALIZING YOUNGBERG’S 
PROTECTION OF LIBERTY FOR THE 
CIVILLY COMMITTED 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
Abstract: Thirty years ago, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that those who are involuntarily committed in a state institu-
tion enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty interest, which protects the 
right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unrea-
sonable restraint, and minimally adequate training sufficient to ensure 
these liberty interests. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that when 
government officials make decisions that constitute a substantial depar-
ture from professional judgment, causing injury to these liberty interests, 
the officials violate the substantive due process guarantee of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that those who are civilly committed in state institu-
tions do not lose their core liberty interests and that they enjoy greater 
protection than convicted criminals, many lower courts have seriously 
eroded the substantive due process protection recognized in Youngberg. 
Two Supreme Court decisions, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services and County of Sacramento v. Lewis, have fueled this erosion. 
This Article seeks to revitalize Youngberg’s protection of liberty for the civ-
illy committed by explaining why neither DeShaney nor Lewis should be in-
terpreted to limit the fundamental liberty interests recognized in Young-
berg. 
Introduction 
 In 1982, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
that those who are involuntarily committed in a state institution enjoy a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, which protects the right to 
reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreason-
able restraint, and minimally adequate training sufficient to ensure 
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these liberty interests.1 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that 
when government officials make decisions that constitute a substantial 
departure from professional judgment, causing injury to these liberty 
interests, the officials violate the substantive due process guarantee of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2 The 
Court rejected the state’s argument that the rigorous Eighth Amend-
ment subjective deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness stan-
dard should govern the due process rights of those who are civilly, as 
opposed to criminally, committed in state institutions.3 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition that those who are civilly 
committed in state institutions do not lose their core liberty interests 
and enjoy greater protection than convicted criminals,4 many lower 
courts have seriously eroded the substantive due process protection 
recognized in Youngberg.5 Two Supreme Court decisions have fueled 
this erosion. One addressed the level of involvement the state must 
have with the injured party to trigger a constitutional duty of care un-
der substantive due process.6 The second focused on the state of mind 
and degree of culpability required to establish that the state’s abuse of 
power reached constitutional dimensions.7 Together, these cases have 
been interpreted to deny Youngberg’s protection of liberty to the civilly 
committed.8 
 Seven years after Youngberg, the Supreme Court, in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, rejected a substantive due 
process claim brought against county welfare department employees 
for failing to intervene to protect a young child from abuse by his fa-
ther.9 Joshua DeShaney was not in the custody of the state,10 and a 
                                                                                                                      
1 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–19 (1982). 
2 Id. at 324. The Constitution forbids governmental deprivation “of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” See U.S. Const. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Sub-
stantive due process ensures the right to be free of arbitrary government actions “regard-
less of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
3 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22, 325; see infra notes 183–185 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the Eighth Amendment subjective indifference standard requires that a 
government actor know that a person faced a substantial risk of serious harm but acted 
with deliberate indifference to the risk). 
4 Id. at 321–22. 
5 See infra notes 144–293 and accompanying text. 
6 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989); see infra 
notes 91–143 and accompanying text. 
7 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998); see infra notes 16–21 and ac-
companying text. 
8 See infra notes 77–78, 186–240 and accompanying text. 
9 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191. 
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third party, not a state actor, inflicted his injury.11 But the Court broadly 
asserted that unless government officials, by an affirmative exercise of 
power, restrain an individual’s liberty, rendering that individual unable 
to protect him or herself, there is no cause of action under the Due 
Process Clause.12 Although Youngberg involved an involuntarily commit-
ted individual, decisions both before and in the years immediately after 
Youngberg did not view the nature of the commitment proceeding as 
critical.13 Many courts recognized that even commitments formally la-
beled as “voluntary” cause a de facto deprivation of liberty.14 After De-
Shaney, however, most appellate courts have held that, in the absence of 
a formal involuntary commitment, individuals in state institutions due 
to an intellectual disability or mental incapacity do not enjoy the liberty 
interests recognized in Youngberg.15 
 Nine years after DeShaney, the Supreme Court further endangered 
the substantive due process protection afforded the civilly committed 
by holding, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, that “only the most egre-
gious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional 
sense.’”16 Thus, to establish a substantive due process violation, plain-
tiffs must prove that the abuse of power “shocks the conscience.”17 Al-
though the Supreme Court did not overturn Youngberg, and in fact 
cited it as valid authority,18 many federal courts have ruled that (1) the 
shocks-the-conscience test supersedes the Youngberg standard, and that 
(2) this test requires that the civilly committed satisfy the rigorous 
Eighth Amendment standard, which Youngberg specifically rejected.19 
Other courts have reasoned that the Youngberg standard is the same as 
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. at 201. 
11 Id. at 203. 
12 Id. at 199–200. 
13 See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
16 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 
(1992)). 
17 Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). 
18 Id. at 852 n.12. 
19 See Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 557–58 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
124 (2012); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008); Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 
F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2006); Moore ex rel. Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir. 
2004); infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text. 
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the shocks-the-conscience standard,20 thus heightening the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof.21 
 This Article seeks to revitalize Youngberg’s protection of liberty for 
the civilly committed by explaining why neither DeShaney nor Lewis 
should be interpreted to limit the fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized in Youngberg. Part I discusses Youngberg and the importance of the 
rights that it guaranteed to the mentally incapacitated who find them-
selves in state institutions.22 Part II discusses DeShaney and the federal 
appellate courts’ overly broad interpretation of its holding to restrict 
Youngberg’s protection to those who have been involuntarily committed 
to state institutions.23 Part II further explains why this broad interpreta-
tion of DeShaney is unwarranted and how it can be circumvented.24 Part 
III discusses Youngberg’s professional judgment standard before examin-
ing Lewis and the confusion it has generated among the circuits regard-
ing the appropriate culpability and “state-of-mind” standards to govern 
substantive due process challenges brought by the civilly committed.25 
Part IV argues that government officials who make decisions that con-
stitute a substantial departure from professional judgment, thereby vio-
lating the Youngberg standard, have engaged in conscience-shocking 
behavior that gives rise to a substantive due process claim.26 Finally, 
Part IV concludes that an objective deliberate indifference test should 
be used to judge the misconduct of nonprofessionals—not the Eighth 
Amendment’s subjective criminal recklessness standard.27 
I. Youngberg’s Recognition of Romeo’s Right to Liberty 
 Nicholas Romeo was an adult male with a profound intellectual 
disability and the mental capacity of an eighteen-month-old child.28 
Until Romeo was twenty-six years old, he lived with his parents in Phila-
delphia, but after his father died, his mother recognized that she was 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 
1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2003); Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 
1998); infra notes 199–215 and accompanying text. 
21 See J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 2010); infra notes 218–220 and accom-
panying text. 
22 See infra notes 28–49 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 50–90 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 91–143 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 144–240 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 241–276 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 277–293 and accompanying text. 
28 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. 
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unable to care for him.29 She asked the Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on a permanent basis, 
explaining in her petition that she could neither care for Romeo nor 
control his violence.30 The court committed Romeo to the Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital pursuant to the state’s involuntary commit-
ment provision.31 Over a two-year period, Romeo suffered injuries on 
at least sixty-three occasions, both self-inflicted and allegedly at the 
hands of other residents.32 Romeo’s mother filed suit, alleging that of-
ficials knew or should have known of Romeo’s plight, and yet they 
failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures in violation of his 
constitutional rights.33 
straint.37 
                                                                                                                     
 The Supreme Court agreed with Romeo’s mother. The Court 
unanimously held that Romeo “enjoy[ed] constitutionally protected 
interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety.”34 First, it ex-
plained that “the right to personal security constitutes a ‘historic liberty 
interest’ protected substantively by the Due Process Clause.”35 Second, 
it recognized a right to freedom from bodily restraint.36 Third, Ro-
meo’s liberty interest required “the State to provide minimally ade-
quate or reasonable training” sufficient to safeguard individual safety 
and avoid undue re
 Having recognized Romeo’s constitutional rights grounded in the 
Due Process Clause, the Court acknowledged the need “to balance ‘the 
liberty of the individual’ and ‘the demands of an organized society.’”38 
The Court cautioned that the balancing should not be left to the un-




31 Id. at 310. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
35 Id. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). 
36 Id. at 316. 
37 Id. at 319. Because Romeo’s severe intellectual disability made it clear that no 
amount of training would facilitate his release, the Court was not required to decide the 
more difficult question of whether the constitutionally protected liberty interest includes 
the right to sufficient training to lead to freedom. Id. at 318. In a concurring opinion, 
three justices maintained that they were inclined to recognize a constitutional right to 
training sufficient to maintain the skills Romeo possessed at the time he entered the state 
facility. Id. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, in a 
separate concurrence, would have flatly held that there is no constitutional right to train-
ing, or “habilitation,” per se. Id. at 330 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
38 Id. at 320 (majority opinion) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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mitted are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are de-
signed to punish.”39 Thus, it rejected the Eighth Amendment criminal 
recklessness standard.40 Because the Court acknowledged that defer-
ence should be given to the judgment of qualified professionals, how-
ever, it determined that “liability may be imposed only when the deci-
sion by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg-
ment.”41 Because the jury was erroneously instructed to apply an Eighth 
Amendment standard of liability, the case was remanded for further 
proceedings.42 
 Notably, the Court defined a “professional” decisionmaker as 
someone “competent, whether by education, training or experience, to 
make the particular decision at issue.”43 The justices also recognized 
that day-to-day decisions regarding care may be made by employees 
who lack formal training, but whom qualified persons nonetheless su-
pervise.44 
 Although Romeo was “involuntarily committed,” it is noteworthy 
that his mother sought the commitment.45 Indeed, in a separate con-
currence, Chief Justice Warren Burger remarked, “The State did not 
seek custody of respondent; his family understandably sought the 
State’s aid to meet a serious need.”46 In fact, at least one case before 
Youngberg treated the constitutional claims the same regardless of 
whether the plaintiff was technically admitted to the state facility as a 
voluntary or involuntary patient.47 After Youngberg, decisions from the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits re-
jected a rigid voluntary/involuntary distinction for analyzing constitu-
tional obligations imposed on officials entrusted with the care of those 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. at 321–22. 
40 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22. 
41 Id. at 323; see also Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the 
Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1405–06 (2008) (discussing the 
professional judgment standard in the context of a state civil commitment statute). 
42 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 325. 
43 Id. at 323 n.30. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 309. 
46 Id. at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
47 See Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that once 
admitted, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the mentally ill patient “had a constitutional 
right to a basically safe and humane living environment”). 
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in state institutions.48 This was the status of the law in 1989 when the 
Supreme Court rendered its controversial decision in DeShaney.49 
II. DeShaney’s Erosion of Substantive Due Process Protection 
 Joshua DeShaney was a young boy who was severely beaten by his 
father on numerous occasions, eventually rendering him permanently 
brain damaged.50 Joshua was not in any state institution; rather, he 
lived with his father.51 Social workers received numerous complaints of 
abuse, but they failed to remove Joshua from his father’s custody.52 The 
father’s second wife complained to the police about the child abuse.53 
Further, examining physicians in a local hospital where Joshua was ad-
mitted with multiple bruises and abrasions notified social workers, as 
did emergency room personnel one month later when Joshua was 
again treated for suspicious injuries.54 Although the caseworker made 
monthly visits to the DeShaney home and observed suspicious injuries, 
she did nothing more, even after a third emergency room notification 
that Joshua was being treated for injuries believed to have resulted from 
child abuse.55 
 The central question before the U.S. Supreme Court in DeShaney 
was whether the state owes any duty to protect a victim when the state 
learns that a third party poses a special danger to that person.56 Al-
though the child’s caseworkers knew that Joshua had been hospitalized 
several times for injuries his father had inflicted, the Supreme Court, in 
a five-to-four ruling, held that a state’s failure to protect an individual 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 907–08 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a volun-
tarily admitted child with an intellectual disability, who was subjected to health-threatening 
conditions in a state facility, could pursue a substantive due process claim for deprivation 
of his constitutional right to minimally adequate shelter and medical care); Soc’y for Good 
Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing 
that children with intellectual disabilities in a state institution were “entitled to safe condi-
tions and freedom from undue restraint” under the Due Process Clause, whether they 
were voluntarily or involuntarily admitted); Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 
713 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that intellectually disabled residents of the 
state school had a right to reasonably safe conditions whether or not they consented to 
admission). 
49 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195; infra notes 50–70 and accompanying text. 
50 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989). 
51 Id. at 191. 
52 Id. at 192–93. 
53 Id. at 192. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 192–93. 
56 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
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against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Proc-
ess Clause.57 
 The majority provided three core justifications for its ruling. First, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist repeatedly stressed that Joshua’s father 
injured him, and his father was a private party over whom the state had 
no control.58 Second, Joshua’s mother challenged the government’s 
failure to act, but the Court held that the Due Process Clause was in-
tended only to prevent government officials from affirmatively acting 
in an arbitrary way.59 Third, Joshua was not in a custodial relationship 
with the state.60 The Court acknowledged that the state has an affirma-
tive duty to care for and protect those who are in a custodial relation-
ship with the state, such as convicted prisoners.61 The Court also cited 
Youngberg’s holding that substantive due process “requires the State to 
provide [civilly] committed [individuals] with such services as are nec-
essary to ensure their ‘reasonable safety’ from themselves and others.”62 
The DeShaney Court described Romeo as someone involuntarily com-
mitted—a person in the state’s custody “against his will.”63 The major-
ity, however, also quoted the more expansive language from Youngberg, 
which acknowledged “a duty to provide certain services and care” to 
institutionalized persons who are “wholly dependent on the State.”64 
 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that the State of Wisconsin neither 
played a part in creating the dangers Joshua faced “nor did it do any-
thing to render him any more vulnerable to them.”65 Moreover, in the 
absence of a custodial relationship or a situation in which the state cre-
ates or enhances the danger, injured parties cannot bring substantive 
due process claims.66 
 A stinging four-justice dissent challenged what it called the major-
ity’s “restatement of Youngberg’s holding” when the majority implied 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”). 
58 See id. at 197 (“[A] State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence 
simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”); id. at 203 (“[T]he 
harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s father.”). 
59 See id. at 196. 
60 Id. at 201 (“[T]he harms Joshua suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s 
custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state 
actor.”). 
61 Id. at 198. 
62 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)). 
63 Id. at 199–200. 
64 Id. at 200 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317). 
65 Id. at 201. 
66 See id. 
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that Romeo’s constitutional rights rested solely on the state’s affirma-
tive act of involuntarily restraining his freedom.67 Rather, Justice Wil-
liam Brennan cited Youngberg’s reasoning that state officials infringed 
Romeo’s rights “by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions 
of confinement.”68 It was not the state that rendered Romeo unable to 
care for himself, but rather the fact that he had the mental capacity of 
an eighteen-month-old child, and his civil commitment “separated him 
from other sources of aid that . . . the State was obligated to replace.”69 
Similarly, the State of Wisconsin, through its child welfare program, 
worsened Joshua’s position by cutting off potential rescuers.70 
A. Substantive Due Process Rights in the Wake of DeShaney: Voluntary Versus 
Involuntary Commitment 
 Before DeShaney, several appellate courts held that the Due Process 
Clause guaranteed the right to a safe and humane environment for all 
patients committed to state institutions, whether involuntarily or volun-
tarily. Although Romeo was technically an involuntary admit under 
Pennsylvania law,71 the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held 
that individuals admitted to state institutions do not waive their due 
process rights by consenting to admission.72 As the Second Circuit ex-
plained, “there is a due process right to freedom from governmentally 
imposed undue bodily restraint for anyone at any time,” and “anyone 
in a state institution has a right to safe conditions.”73 Several of these 
decisions recognized that the distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary commitment of individuals with severe mental disabilities is spu-
rious.74 Those who find themselves in state institutions based upon the 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 See id. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
68 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
315). 
69 Id. Applying Youngberg’s standard, the dissent would have held Joshua’s caseworkers li-
able if their decisions demonstrated a substantial departure from professional judgment, but 
not simply because they acted negligently or made a mistake of judgment. Id. at 211–12. 
70 Id. at 210. 
71 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310. 
72 See Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 907 n.44 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that 
“Savidge has liberty interests even though he was not institutionalized through formal 
commitment proceedings”); Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 
F.2d 1239, 1245–46 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the voluntary/involuntary distinction); Ass’n 
for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1392–93 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that 
consent to confinement does not render an individual’s liberty less worthy of protection). 
73 Soc’y for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1245–46. 
74 See, e.g., Savidge, 836 F.2d at 908 n.44 (recognizing that “Savidge’s confinement at 
the [state facility] was no more ‘voluntary’ than Romeo’s confinement” and citing the 
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unilateral application of their parents or guardians are effectively in-
voluntary admits.75 Further, adults who suffer from severe mental ill-
ness may be incapable of expressing a desire to leave the state institu-
tion, or they may lack the finances to go elsewhere.76 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite these arguments, the growing consensus among federal 
courts after DeShaney is that the involuntary nature of Romeo’s admis-
sion gave rise to substantive due process protection. Thus, any custodial 
situation short of involuntary commitment does not create due process 
rights to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable 
restraint, or training.77 Under this view, residents have no right to pro-
 
 
passage in Youngberg that describes how Romeo’s mother petitioned for his permanent 
admission to the state facility due to her inability to control him); Soc’y for Good Will, 737 
F.2d at 1245 n.4 (recognizing that plaintiffs were “unlikely to have sufficient understanding 
to recognize that they are being admitted to a school for the mentally retarded and to 
understand the distinction between voluntary and involuntary status or the provisions 
governing release”); see also Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 378–79 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (ex-
plaining that although the plaintiff was admitted voluntarily, “he may well have had only a 
de jure, and not a de facto, right to leave”). 
75 See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Lewis Wells, Government Inaction as a Constitutional 
Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107, 145 & n.187 (1991) (attacking the 
involuntary confinement requirement because a voluntarily admitted patient is unable to 
look out for his or her own interests and the patient’s relatives do not have the ability to 
care for him or her, and noting that “[i]t is difficult to see why the circumstances of the 
patient’s commitment entitle him to less attention from directors and employees of the 
institution than an involuntary patient receives”). 
76 See Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484 (D.N.D. 1982) 
(noting that plaintiffs with severe intellectual disabilities are incapable of giving consent, 
and even when plaintiffs may be capable of giving informed consent to admission, it is 
questionable whether the consent is truly “voluntary in light of pressures from family and 
the high cost and unavailability of alternative care”), aff’d, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). 
77 See, e.g., Campbell v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 843–45 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that a mother who voluntarily committed her developmentally delayed 
thirty-three-year-old daughter to a state facility could not bring a substantive due process 
action for the drowning of her adult child, even though state officials monitored and con-
trolled every aspect of the deceased’s daily life and prevented her from leaving the facil-
ity), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 275 (2012); Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 446 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that “the District Court erred in concluding that the state owes an affirma-
tive due process duty of care to residents of a state [mental] institution who are free to 
leave state custody”); Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate, 101 F.3d 818, 
822–24 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that because severely disabled adults were not involuntarily 
institutionalized, Youngberg’s requirement that due process mandates the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment does not apply); Brooks v. Giuliani, 84 F.3d 1454, 1465–67 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that an “expressed intent to provide assistance,” without an “affirmative act 
of restraining the individual’s freedom to act,” does not create any duty on the part of state 
guardians vis-à-vis intellectually disabled adults placed in residential care, and concluding 
that “the State Defendants had no duty under the Due Process Clause to provide profes-
sionally adequate care” because the intellectually disabled patients were voluntarily in the 
state’s care); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that mere 
custody will not support a substantive due process claim where a “person voluntarily resides 
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fessionally adequate care unless the state, through formal involuntary 
commitment proceedings, has limited the individual’s ability to act on 
his or her own behalf.78 
 At least one court has continued to question DeShaney’s volun-
tary/involuntary distinction,79 whereas others have tried to circumvent 
it through a more flexible approach. For example, an Eighth Circuit 
opinion acknowledged that, even if a patient is initially voluntarily ad-
mitted, a change in her condition, coupled with a statutorily imposed 
duty to refuse to release a “voluntary” patient who poses a substantial 
risk of harm to herself or others, might render the situation “suffi-
ciently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to 
an affirmative duty to protect.”80 Similarly, in 2006, the Third Circuit 
reasoned that an initially “voluntary commitment may, over time, take 
on the character of an involuntary one,” and commitments labeled as 
“voluntary” may arguably be de facto deprivations of liberty from their 
inception.81 
 In recent decisions, however, most appellate courts have moved 
toward a rigid adherence to the voluntary/involuntary legal distinction, 
insulating professionals from any constitutional liability for their mis-
                                                                                                                      
in a state facility under its custodial rules” (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200); Monahan v. 
Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 991–92 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a pa-
tient’s voluntary commitment in a state mental treatment facility did not “trigger a corre-
sponding due process duty to assume a special responsibility for his protection,” and re-
jecting the plaintiff’s argument that his mental condition, which “may have made him 
functionally dependent on his caretakers,” imposed upon the state a constitutional duty to 
provide for his safety and well-being). 
78 See Suffolk, 101 F.3d at 824; Brooks, 84 F.3d at 1466–67; Walton, 44 F.3d at 1305. 
79 See Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 682 n.1, 682–84 (6th Cir. 2008) (questioning 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary commitment, and reasoning that a pa-
tient voluntarily committed to a state institution enjoys a constitutional right to freedom 
from undue bodily restraint, but not deciding “whether the State owes the same affirma-
tive constitutional duties of care and protection to its voluntarily admitted residents as it 
owes to its involuntarily committed residents under Youngberg”). 
80 Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 294–95 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. 
at 201 n.9); see also Walton, 44 F.3d at 1306–07 (Parker, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
state’s acceptance of custody and its extensive control over a minor resident at a state 
school for the deaf rendered it more than a “passive player in the facts and circumstances” 
that led to the sexual molestation of a minor resident by a fellow student). A few federal 
district courts in the wake of DeShaney similarly held that a voluntarily committed incompe-
tent patient may be a de facto involuntary patient based on evidence of the statutorily pre-
scribed guidelines for restraining patients or actions of facility staff persuading a patient to 
withdraw requests for relief. See Estate of Cassara v. Illinois, 853 F. Supp. 273, 278–80 (N.D. 
Ill. 1994); United States v. Pennsylvania, 832 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Halderman 
v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215, 222 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d sub nom. Halder-
man ex rel. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992). 
81 Torisky, 446 F.3d at 446 (citation omitted). 
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conduct. For example, the Eighth Circuit in 1995 applied a flexible ap-
proach and held that when the state placed a voluntarily admitted pa-
tient on suicide watch, thereby depriving her of a degree of liberty, the 
substantive due process right to appropriate professional care was trig-
gered.82 In sharp contrast, another Eighth Circuit panel in 2012 re-
jected claims brought by the estate of a voluntarily admitted patient 
who committed suicide three days after her doctor removed her from 
suicide watch.83 The court reasoned that the decision to take the pa-
tient off suicide watch could not be challenged under the Due Process 
Clause.84 Similarly, although the Ninth Circuit initially appeared to ig-
nore the voluntary/involuntary distinction,85 in 2011 a Ninth Circuit 
panel ruled that mere custody does not support a substantive due pro-
cess claim where persons “voluntarily” reside in a state facility.86 Fur-
ther, the Seventh Circuit in a 1983 decision reasoned that confinement 
to a mental institution creates a de facto special relationship with the 
state,87 but relying on DeShaney, the court now holds that mere resi-
dence in a state facility does not suffice to create such a relationship 
when the person is admitted voluntarily.88 
                                                                                                                     
 Significantly, the State of Tennessee, in defending itself against 
substantive due process claims brought by residents with intellectual 
disabilities at a state-operated home, recently acknowledged that “a cir-
cuit split existed in the early 1990s regarding . . . Youngberg rights.”89 
The State then asserted that there is now “a consensus that states do not 
owe Youngberg rights to [intellectually disabled] residents who have 
been voluntarily placed into state care by a parent or other legal repre-
sentative” —rather, involuntary confinement is necessary before resi-
dents’ Youngberg rights are implicated.90 
 
82 Kennedy, 71 F.3d at 294–95. 
83 Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2012). 
84 Id. at 843. 
85 See Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995) (asserting broadly that 
mental patients in state institutions have a right to personal security); see also Jackson v. 
Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
Due Process Clause imposes a duty to provide safe living conditions “to disabled persons 
who are institutionalized or wholly dependent on the state”). 
86 Campbell, 671 F.3d at 845. 
87 See Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983). 
88 Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 703–04 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a disabled 
student residing in a state school for the disabled was not “in custody” for purposes of a 
claim arising from assault by other students, because the student was voluntarily admitted 
to the school). 
89 United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. 
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B. Reining in DeShaney’s Negative Impact on the Rights  
of the Civilly Committed 
 The existence or nonexistence of constitutional rights should not 
hinge on arbitrary, irrational distinctions. There are several arguments 
that should be made to ensure the rights of all those civilly committed 
in state institutions. First, as some appellate courts recognized before 
DeShaney, drawing a legal distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
patients ignores the reality that most of those committed to state insti-
tutions have no real say regarding their confinement, due to their men-
tal incapacity or financial situation.91 One study of various state com-
mitment statutes indicates eight overlapping types of commitment, but 
only one permits patients to discharge themselves freely.92 Under many 
“voluntary” commitment laws, patients who seek to leave may be sub-
ject to continued confinement for evaluation, or they may be required 
to undergo treatment procedures without consent.93 Further, third-
party commitment by parents or guardians may appear voluntary, but 
once committed, discharge may not occur without an administrative or 
judicial proceeding.94 In any event, a resident placed in a state institu-
tion as a result of a third party initiating commitment proceedings did 
not exercise his or her own free choice. 
 The facts in Youngberg clearly demonstrate the irrationality of bas-
ing substantive due process analysis on commitment status. Romeo’s 
mother sought out state help and voluntarily left her son’s care to the 
state.95 The state nonetheless had a duty to protect his liberty rights 
because, under Pennsylvania law, the commitment was characterized as 
an involuntary placement.96 In sharp contrast, in 2011 in Campbell v. 
Washington Department of Social and Health Services, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a severely mentally incapacitated thirty-three-year-old patient 
in a state institution, who drowned in a bathtub, had no protection un-
der the substantive due process guarantee.97 The patient’s mother al-
leged that state employees acted with deliberate indifference to the 
safety of their charge by leaving the patient unattended in the bath-
                                                                                                                      
 Constitutional Perspective, 18 
Men al Disability L. Rep. 320, 321–22 (1994). 
nying text. 
09–10. 
.3d at 845. 
91 See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
92 See John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A
tal & Physic
93 Id. at 321. 
94 Id. at 321–22. 
95 See supra notes 45–46 and accompa
96 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 3
97 Campbell, 671 F
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tub.98 But the court, without examining these allegations, dismissed the 
mother’s claims because she “voluntarily” admitted her daughter.99 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the state’s involvement, in-
cluding monitoring and controlling every aspect of the deceased’s daily 
life, preventing her from leaving the facility, and failing to inform the 
mother of her ability to terminate the custodial relationship, converted 
voluntary custody into de facto involuntary custody.100 Further, the fact 
that the mother’s guardianship rights had been terminated due to her 
failure to complete paperwork did not alter the voluntary nature of the 
confinement.101 
 As for mentally ill adults, litigation against state facilities has dem-
onstrated that in many situations, voluntariness in connection with ad-
mission and exit from state institutions is an illusory concept.102 In-
deed, one year after DeShaney, the Supreme Court, in Zinermon v. Burch, 
addressed the due process rights of an individual allegedly voluntarily 
admitted to a state institution under circumstances that clearly indi-
cated that the patient was incapable of giving consent.103 The admitting 
staff reported that “Burch was hallucinating, confused, and psychotic 
and believed he was in heaven.”104 Nonetheless, because he was “volun-
tarily” admitted, the staff held Burch in a state facility for 152 days 
without any hearing concerning his admission or treatment.105 
 The Zinermon Court observed that it was highly foreseeable that a 
patient requesting treatment for mental illness, like Burch, might be 
incapable of informed consent.106 Thus, Florida’s statutory provision 
allowing “voluntary” patients to be detained without procedural safe-
guards did not insulate the state from liability for its procedural due 
process violation in failing to ensure that the patient had the mental 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 841–42. 
99 Id. at 843. 
100 Id. at 844–45. 
101 Id. at 844. 
102 See Halderman, 784 F. Supp. at 222 (noting that approximately fifty percent of the 
residents at a state institution had not been legally committed); see also Christopher Slo-
bogin et al., Law and the Mental Health System 705, 860–61 (5th ed. 2009) (arguing 
that a substantial number of decisions to enter a residential facility voluntarily are made 
when a person is in official custody or is faced with the prospect of involuntary commit-
ment as the main alternative to voluntary admission); Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of 
Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Per-
sons, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1169, 1173–75, 1185 (1997) (noting that many commitment deci-
sions are made while individuals are incompetent or are the result of coercion). 
103 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). 
104 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
105 Id. at 120. 
106 Id. at 136. 
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capacity to provide legal consent.107 This failure, the Court implied, 
demonstrated that state officials did not exercise professional judg-
ment.108 Zinermon arguably put state officials on notice that they must 
obtain actual informed consent to avoid liability. Nonetheless, adminis-
trative and treatment procedures are less complicated for voluntary 
patients, creating an incentive for hospital staff to unduly influence or 
coerce patients to elect voluntary status, as occurred in Zinermon.109 
 Any argument that those voluntarily admitted into state institutions 
have waived their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause 
makes little sense in the context of individuals incapable of giving con-
sent or who lack any real alternative due to their financial situation.110 
Further, those who do voluntarily commit themselves have not know-
ingly consented to treatment that falls below accepted professional stan-
dards. By emphasizing the involuntary nature of Romeo’s commitment, 
DeShaney extended an invitation to lower courts mechanically to deny 
due process rights to patients committed to the state’s custody. The 
analysis shifted from a consideration of the state’s actual relationship 
and involvement with a civilly committed patient, who depends on the 
institution for appropriate care and protection from dangerous condi-
tions of confinement, to the purely technical question of the patient’s 
admission status.111 Federal courts took a wrong turn when they ceased 
to look beyond labels to recognize de facto involuntary status, based ei-
ther on the reality of the initial commitment process or on changed cir-
cumstances.112 
 In addition to critiquing the arbitrariness of the voluntary/involun-
tary distinction, this Article invokes three distinguishing factors in De-
Shaney to rein in the Supreme Court’s assertion that substantive due 
process is triggered only where the state affirmatively restrains a person’s 
liberty.113 First, DeShaney involved a noncustodial situation—the Court in 
fact implied that if Joshua had been placed in foster care, it may have 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 135–37. 
108 See id. at 138–39. 
109 See supra notes 103–109 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text. 
111 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 206–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stressing that the state’s 
failure to act in Youngberg to protect Romeo, rather than its affirmative act of restraining 
him under involuntary commitment, led to his injuries). 
112 See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text (explaining that the Seventh, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits have recently adopted a strict voluntary/involuntary legal distinction 
that insulates professionals from liability when a plaintiff is voluntarily committed). 
113 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
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ruled differently.114 Second, the Court emphasized that third parties, 
over whom the state had no control, had inflicted the injury.115 Third, 
the Court characterized the caseworker’s behavior as involving only gov-
ernment inaction—the state “played no part” in creating the dangers 
that Joshua faced, and did nothing “to render him any more vulnerable 
to them.”116 The Court suggested that the situation would be different if 
the government had taken affirmative action that somehow created—or 
at least increased—the danger that Joshua faced.117 These three factors 
provide direction for circumventing DeShaney’s harsh edict. 
 First, unlike cases directly analogous to DeShaney, cases premised 
on Youngberg involve residents who are in the state’s physical custody 
and who are wholly dependent on the state institution for their basic 
needs.118 As one commentator has persuasively argued, “The custody 
concept should be linked to the condition of being in an environment 
subject to the state’s control and supervision, rather than to the process 
of how one got there.”119 Under most state statutes, residents in state 
institutions are not free to leave.120 Further, regardless of state law, they 
are de facto deprived of their liberty once the state assumes custody 
over them. 
 Second, rather than challenging the conduct of private parties, 
Youngberg plaintiffs are suing state officials who directly cause harm to 
patients by adopting policies or making decisions regarding staffing or 
treatment that substantially depart from professional judgment.121 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 See id. at 201 n.9 (acknowledging that the situation in which the state removes a 
child from “free society” and places him or her in a foster home might be “sufficiently 
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to pro-
tect”). Lower courts since DeShaney have uniformly recognized a constitutional right to 
protection from unnecessary harm on the part of children placed in foster care settings. 
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 172–75 (4th Cir. 
2010) ( joining the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in determining that a 
special custodial relationship exists when the state takes a child from his or her caregiver 
and places the child in foster care, and holding that placement of a child in a known, dan-
gerous foster care environment in deliberate indifference to the child’s right to reasonable 
safety and security violates substantive due process). 
115 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. 
116 Id. at 201. 
117 See id. at 201 n.9. 
118 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
119 Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 435, 444 (1994). 
120 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
121 See, e.g., T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that al-
though state actors do not have a due process obligation to protect citizens from private 
violence absent a special custodial relationship, school officials may be liable for their own 
conduct in adopting policies that are deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of 
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Plaintiffs are seeking to hold government officials liable for their own 
constitutional violations—not for harm that non-state actors perpe-
trate—whether by making affirmative decisions or by failing to prevent 
the constitutional wrongdoing of their staff.122 The Sixth Circuit has 
recognized this distinction. It concedes that the voluntary or involun-
tary status of a patient is relevant to whether the state has a duty to pro-
tect a patient from harm by third-parties and non-state actors, but con-
cludes that the patient’s status “is irrelevant as to his constitutional right 
to be free from the State depriving him of liberty without due process,” 
including the right to be free from physical abuse at the hands of the 
state.123 
 Third, Youngberg plaintiffs often assert that government officials 
took affirmative action that actually created or enhanced the danger, 
triggering substantive due process protection even in the absence of an 
involuntary situation.124 All circuits, except for the Fifth,125 have recog-
nized the so-called “state-created danger theory” as a basis for imposing 
substantive due process liability for government wrongdoing.126 
                                                                                                                      
 
children); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (reasoning 
that DeShaney does not foreclose a due process claim against a school teacher, rather than 
fellow students, for violating a student’s substantive due process rights because DeShaney 
did not suggest that individuals have no due process rights against an offending state ac-
tor); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724–25 (3d Cir. 1989) (reasoning 
that DeShaney did not affect whether municipal policymakers could be held liable for reck-
lessly making decisions that allegedly resulted in a student’s sexual abuse by her teacher 
because that determination was not dependent upon the existence of a special custodial 
relationship). 
122 See Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2011) (recognizing hospital administrators’ duty to protect minor patients from a staff 
member’s sexual assault), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2379 (2012). 
123 Lanman, 529 F.3d at 682 n.1. 
124 See infra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
125 See Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 864 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (confirming that the Fifth Circuit has never explicitly adopted the 
state-created danger theory). 
126 See J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79 n.3 (1st Cir. 2010); Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., 
528 F.3d 199, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2008); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324–25 
(5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing multiple circuits’ adoption of the state-created danger the-
ory). The circuits, however, are divided as to what elements a plaintiff must meet to come 
within this doctrine, and most courts have developed draconian five- or six-prong tests that 
invariably deny relief, by requiring, for example, that the harm to specific victims must be 
foreseeable and that the officials committed affirmative acts to increase the danger, put-
ting a victim at substantial risk of serious immediate harm. See, e.g., Gray v. Univ. of Colo. 
Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 925–27 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that hospital personnel could 
not be held responsible for the death of an unattended patient who was promised constant 
monitoring because providing untruthful assurances to the decedent and his family did 
not constitute “affirmative conduct” sufficient to invoke the state-created danger theory, 
even when the state actors were aware of a serious risk that they expressly promised to 
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 Although this Article urges an expansive interpretation of the “cus-
todial” requirement to include all civilly committed individuals, the 
state-created danger theory provides an alternative basis for imposing 
liability. For example, if a patient’s condition worsens in the state insti-
tution due to the state’s failure to provide care or treatment, the state 
has enhanced the danger that the individual may do harm to himself or 
herself or be particularly vulnerable to harm that staff or fellow patients 
impose.127 Further, professionals who fail to screen, train, or discipline 
staff affirmatively subject residents to an increased risk of harm. Admit-
tedly, “failure to act” cases raise the DeShaney Court’s concern that the 
Due Process Clause be interpreted to reach only affirmative acts by 
state officials. The Court in Youngberg, however, recognized an affirma-
tive obligation on the part of the state to confine the individual under 
“conditions of reasonable care and safety” that are “reasonably nonre-
                                                                                                                      
eliminate but failed to do so); Campbell, 671 F.3d at 845–47 (holding that state employees 
who ordered a developmentally delayed resident in a state facility to take an unsupervised 
bath could not be held liable for the resident drowning in the bathtub because the state 
employees’ conduct did not create the situation that resulted in the drowning); Walter v. 
Pike Cnty., 544 F.3d 182, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring the plaintiff to show that af-
firmative acts harmed him and concluding that the defendant’s failure to warn the plain-
tiff about a suspect’s likelihood of engaging in violent behavior must be characterized as 
inaction); cf. Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that police who 
arrested a woman with bipolar disorder and then released her in a hazardous neighbor-
hood where she was raped and suffered permanent brain damage violated the victim’s 
constitutional rights by gratuitously increasing her risk of injury); Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-
on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 428–31 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a police offi-
cer’s behavior enhanced the danger to a victim of domestic abuse by affirmatively encour-
aging or condoning her husband’s misconduct). For a discussion of the multi-prong tests 
that courts have developed to insulate officials under the state-created danger theory, see 
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 
60 Fla. L. Rev. 519, 537–41 (2008). 
127 The Tenth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Gray v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority 
presents this scenario. Gray, 672 F.3d at 912–13. The patient and his family were specifically 
told that he would receive twenty-four-hour-per-day intensive care monitoring, understand-
ing that anything less would expose him to life-threatening epileptic seizures because he 
had been taken off of his medication. Id. at 912. But hospital protocol permitted “staff to 
leave patients unattended and unobserved,” and during a period of unattendance the 
patient experienced a seizure and died. Id. Nonetheless, the court narrowly construed the 
state-created danger theory, ruling that untruthful assurances do not constitute “affirma-
tive conduct” sufficient to invoke this theory, because rendering a person more vulnerable 
to a known risk does not create a constitutional duty to protect. See id. at 921–22. Further, 
the defendant’s policy of permitting staff to leave patients experiencing seizures unat-
tended could not qualify as the requisite affirmative act because it did not pose a direct 
threat to a particular individual and lacked a causal link between the danger and the re-
sulting harm. Id. at 925–27. 
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strictive” and to provide the individual with any training that may be 
required by these interests.128 
 The core of substantive due process is its protection against a 
state’s “abuse of power,” which should encompass claims based on gov-
ernment inaction that can be causally linked to the constitutional rights 
deprivation.129 Quite simply, a “failure to act” claim can be recast as an 
affirmative decision to provide treatment or care that falls below ac-
cepted professional standards, contrary to Youngberg’s “affirmative act” 
mandate.130 In addition, a core problem with imposing liability only 
when government officials take affirmative action is that it creates an 
incentive not to act—not to provide the care and treatment that com-
ports with professional judgment to those who find themselves totally 
reliant on a state institution.131 
 This Article focuses on substantive due process rights, but the irra-
tionality of treating voluntarily admitted patients differently than those 
involuntarily admitted also raises equal protection problems. Although 
the Supreme Court has ruled that classifications based on intellectual 
disability or mental incapacity do not trigger strict scrutiny,132 it is irra-
tional to provide or deny fundamental liberty interests based on what is 
often a state’s arbitrary statutory characterization of its civilly commit-
                                                                                                                      
128 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
129 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]naction can be every bit 
as abusive of power as action . . . .”). Pre-DeShaney, Judge Richard Posner colorfully re-
marked, “If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails 
to protect him, . . . it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake 
pit.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
130 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 75, at 109 n.9 (noting that “the distinction between 
acts and omissions often turns on how one poses the question”). Professors Thomas Eaton 
and Michael Lewis Wells more broadly challenge the DeShaney majority’s conclusion that 
due process was not intended to provide affirmative protection of life, liberty, or property 
against invasion by private parties. See id. at 119. Significantly, history supports the view that 
those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were con-
cerned with Ku Klux Klan violence and the inaction of local sheriffs in response. Id. Sec-
tion 1983 permits any individual within the jurisdiction of the United States who has been 
deprived of federal rights by a state actor under color of law to seek damages or injunctive 
relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
131 Eaton & Wells, supra note 75, at 128 (“Encouraging cost effective protective action 
would reduce the overall injury costs to society and eliminate some harms to some indi-
viduals.”). 
132 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315 (1993). But cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that the requirement of a special use permit 
for a home for individuals with intellectual disabilities was based on “irrational prejudice” 
and was, therefore, invalid under a rational basis test). 
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ted.133 Further, it is incongruous that states should owe a duty of care 
and protection to individuals committed to state institutions due to 
mental incapacity following a criminal conviction, while at the same 
time having no constitutional obligations with regard to those “volun-
tarily” committed to the same institutions.134 
 The Supreme Court has recognized equal protection claims root-
ed in the denial of core liberty interests, acknowledging that height-
ened scrutiny of government action is triggered based on either the 
recognition of a suspect class or the existence of a fundamental right 
that is allocated arbitrarily among different groups.135 Because the right 
to life and personal liberty are fundamental rights, a classification that 
guarantees these rights to those involuntarily committed to state institu-
tions, despite denying them to those purportedly “voluntarily” admit-
ted, could not withstand strict scrutiny.136 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, acknowledged that the liberty interests it recognized in Youngberg 
did not trigger strict scrutiny; rather, Romeo’s interests had to be “bal-
anced” against the state’s competing interests, which need not be prov-
en compelling.137 Nonetheless, striking that balance based on idiosyn-
                                                                                                                      
 
133 Cf. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3 (noting that the selective denial of services to “cer-
tain disfavored minorities” would violate the Equal Protection Clause (citing Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Although patients voluntarily admitted into state institu-
tions are not recognized as disfavored minorities, all classifications must meet a minimal 
rationality test. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
134 See West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745, 748–49 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that involuntar-
ily committed patients, including civilly committed sex offenders, are entitled to an as-
sessment of their needs using professional judgment). 
135 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 691–92 
(4th ed. 2011) (explaining that the Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to protect 
fundamental rights including the right to procreate, vote, access the judicial process, and 
travel between states). 
136 See Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Ass’n for Re-
tarded Citizens, 561 F. Supp. at 485 n.14 (indicating that “the denial of liberty rights to vol-
untarily committed patients may itself violate the state’s fourteenth amendment duty to 
give all its citizens equal protection of the law” (citing Bruce G. Mason & Frank J. 
Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scien-
tific Interface, 10 Creighton L. Rev. 124, 127 (1976)). 
137 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320. The Supreme Court has stated that different consti-
tutional claims are subjected to “varying levels of review.” Chemerinsky, supra note 135, at 
552 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)). The 
lowest level of review is the “rational basis test,” which all laws challenged under either the 
Due Process Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause must meet. Id. Under rational basis 
review, “the government’s objective only need be a goal that is legitimate for the govern-
ment to pursue.” Id. The middle level of review is “intermediate scrutiny,” which requires 
that a law be “substantially related to an important government purpose” for it to be up-
held. Id. at 552. The most demanding level of review is strict scrutiny, which requires that a 
law be “necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose” to be held constitutional. 
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cratic differences in commitment statutes subjects those who are simi-
larly situated to disparate treatment, contrary to the most basic guaran-
tee of equal protection. 
 As discussed, the actual “voluntariness” of patients entering state 
facilities under state commitment statutes is clearly in doubt.138 Further, 
even those who truly voluntarily admit themselves to state institutions 
do not knowingly consent to forfeiture of their basic liberty rights to 
treatment and care that comport with professional judgment. The fact 
that core liberty interests are at stake, and that these interests are often 
allocated based on “irrational” classification schemes, highlights the 
constitutional problems inherent in broadly reading DeShaney to fore-
close Youngberg claims except by those the state has formally involuntar-
ily committed. The “forced custodial relationship” approach, which 
requires an involuntary custodial relationship to trigger a due process 
analysis, fails to recognize that other types of government involvement 
with the injured party should give rise to constitutional protection. 
 Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Youngberg emphasized that 
states incur a duty to care for institutionalized, wholly dependent indi-
viduals.139 DeShaney altered the judicial landscape, creating a circuit 
split as to when this constitutional duty is triggered.140 The emerging 
consensus has been to adhere rigidly to the voluntary/involuntary dis-
tinction, denying any constitutional protection from abuse of govern-
ment power to those civilly committed in state institutions.141 As one 
scholar persuasively argued five years after DeShaney, “the criterion of 
involuntariness should not serve as a talisman for either the duty owed 
or the standard of culpability applied.”142 All patients who are civilly 
                                                                                                                      
 
Id. at 554; see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (discussing statutes that make classifications 
based on race, alienage, or national origin and explaining that “these laws are subjected to 
strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest”). 
138 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
139 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317. Although the mentally incapacitated may not have any 
affirmative rights to government services, once the state decides to provide care and 
treatment facilities for them, substantive due process mandates that the facilities be run in 
a manner consistent with the constitutional rights of the residents. See Soc’y for Good Will, 
737 F.2d at 1246. 
140 See Blum, supra note 119, at 435 (noting that five years after DeShaney, no “clear 
consensus” had emerged as to the state’s duty to protect persons outside the context of 
involuntary confinement); see also supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
142 See Blum, supra note 119, at 438–39. To support her conclusion, this scholar relied 
on cases involving children voluntarily placed in the foster care system by their parents 
when the state had no constitutional duty to care for or protect the children, as compared 
to its obligation to those involuntarily placed. See id. at 443–44. She forcefully concludes 
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committed, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are subject to the 
state’s control and supervision and thus should be entitled to substan-
tive due process protection. Recognizing a duty of care for all those 
committed to state institutions will not open the floodgates by trans-
forming basic torts into constitutional violations. Rather, Youngberg 
mandates only that government officials make decisions regarding 
those in its care that do not substantially depart from professional 
judgment.143 
III. The Im tantive 
Due Pro ought  
pact of Lewis’s Shocks-the-Conscience Subs
cess Standard on Claims Br
by the Civilly Committed 
 Because the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1989 DeShaney decision de-
termined that there was no constitutional duty to protect Joshua De-
Shaney from his father, it did not address the state of mind or level of 
culpability required to make out a substantive due process violation.144 
Prior to the Court’s 1998 decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,145 the 
lower courts adopted multiple standards to govern this issue, including 
gross negligence,146 recklessness,147 deliberate indifference,148 and the 
shocks-the-conscience test.149 The shocks-the-conscience language, 
which addresses level of culpability rather than any prerequisite state of 
mind, has its origin in the Supreme Court’s 1952 decision in Rochin v. 
                                                                                                                      
that “[c]ommon sense and notions of basic fairness dictate that all children, whether 




 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 
(19
ng that reckless or callous 
ind
quired for pretrial detainees to estab-
lish
ience standard as the appropriate test for adjudicating sub-
stan
er the Constitution.” Id. at 444. 
143 See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
144 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 n.10 (1989). 
145 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (limiting the defini
stitutionally “arbitrary” behavior to “only the most egregious official conduct”). 
146 See Simescu v. Emmet Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that gross negligence suffices for a substantive due process claim); Fargo v. City of 
San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 640 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that gross negligence 
or recklessness is sufficient to state a due process claim), abrogated by Lewis v. Sacramento 
Cnty., 98
98). 
147 See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1989) (holdi
ifference is required for a substantive due process violation). 
148 See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing 
deliberate indifference as the level of culpability re
 a violation of their personal security interests). 
149 See Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720–21 (4th Cir. 1991) (rec-
ognizing the shocks-the-consc
tive due process claims). 
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California.150 Antonio Richard Rochin invoked substantive due process 
defensively in a criminal proceeding to exclude evidence that the state 
obtained when it pumped his stomach.151 The Court reasoned that the 
official’s abusive conduct shocked the judicial conscience.152 Notably, 
thirty years later, the Youngberg Court neither mentioned Rochin nor in-
voked its shocks-the-conscience language. In fact, outside the context of 
the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court prior to Lewis largely ignored 
the shocks-the-conscience test.153 
 the conscience,” nor did it discuss any state-of-
                                                                                                                     
A. Youngberg’s Professional Judgment Standard 
 The Supreme Court in Youngberg recognized that, although the de-
cisions of professional administrators are presumptively valid and must 
be given considerable deference, they will be held unconstitutional if 
they are “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsi-
ble actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”154 The 
Court did not hold that the substantial departure from professional 
judgment must “shock
mind requirement.155 
 At least one critic, nonetheless, has challenged the Youngberg stan-
dard as providing insufficient protection to those who are civilly com-
mitted. Professor Susan Stefan has argued that the presumption of va-
lidity and the strong deference that the justices afforded professionals 
were unwarranted.156 She asserts that the Court erroneously relied on 
the assumption that professionals act neutrally, whereas, in reality, their 
 
150 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 173 (holding that forcibly pumping the defendant’s stomach violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
153 But see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (arguing, in part, 
that a city’s deliberate indifference to a worker’s safety did not “shock the conscience” of 
federal judges and thus was not actionable (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172)). The Collins 
Court, however, focused on the employer-employee relationship at issue, and it was not 
until Lewis that the Court affirmatively adopted “shocks the conscience” as the governing 
standard for all challenges to misconduct by members of the executive branch. See Rosalie 
Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 307, 312–20 
(2010) (tracing the birth and development of the shocks-the-conscience test from Rochin 
through Lewis and arguing that the Court erred in subjecting misconduct by members of 
the executive branch to a more rigorous standard than challenges to legislative or judicial 
abuses of power). 
154 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). 
155 See infra notes 247–276 and accompanying text. 
156 Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to Abdication Under the 
Professional Judgment Standard, 102 Yale L.J. 639, 644–46 (1992). 
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decisions may reflect bias against racial minorities and the indigent, 
groups that are overrepresented in state institutions.157 In her study, 
Professor Stefan presents stunning statistics regarding the misdiagnosis 
of racial minorities.158 For example, schizophrenia was misdiagnosed in 
black patients at almost twice the rate of white patients.159 Further, she 
notes that public concerns regarding limited resources may conflict 
with individual interests and may color professional judgment.160 Be-
cause even the exercise of professional judgment may invade constitu-
tional rights, she opines that the Court “abdicated its responsibility to 
provide a barrier between the individual and unwanted professional 
tru
tions in these institutions.163 Despite its drawbacks, however, the Young-
                                                                                                                     
in sion by the state.”161 
 Youngberg’s ruling is now thirty years old, but the concerns that 
Professor Stefan raised in 1992 are even more valid today—namely, ra-
cial minorities and the indigent are still clearly overrepresented in state 




irement is clearly an improvement over the pro-
fess
.g., Susan Bandes, 
The
7 (2001)). See generally Stefan, supra note 156 
(sum
 
157 Id. at 659–6
158 Id. at 6
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 661 (“[P]rofessional judgment, as envisioned by the Supreme Court, is dis-
torted beyond recognition by the limited resources, coercive environment, and unavoid-
able conflicts of interest inherent in the public sector.”). Professor Stefan forcefully argues 
that professional judgment is impossible in light of conditions in state institutions, such as 
the one in which Youngberg’s Romeo was institutionalized. See id. at 662–63. She opines that 
the Youngberg standard is even less protective than rational basis analysis because the court 
simply inquires as to whether the decision conforms to professional judgment, rather than 
examining the lack of a relationship between the decision and some stated purpose. See id. 
at 678 (“[T]he rational relationship requ
ional judgment standard.”). 
161 Id. at 643. Ultimately, she concedes that the Youngberg standard is more appropriate 
where a plaintiff claims an affirmative entitlement to professional services, as opposed to 
situations where the individual seeks to limit state restrictions on privacy or liberty. Id. at 
667–70. Other commentators have criticized the dichotomy between affirmative and nega-
tive rights, which became the Supreme Court’s focus in DeShaney. See, e
 Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2273 (1990). 
162 Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial Disparities in Health Care and Cultural Competency, 48 St. Lou-
is U. L.J. 75, 93–94 (2003) (discussing a 2001 Surgeon General report that documented 
racial disparities in the mental health system, such as the misdiagnosis and excessive con-
finement of racial minorities, and arguing that the report suggests that the healthcare 
system’s culture is ethnocentric (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Mental 
Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity 6
marizing Professor Stefan’s concerns). 
163 See, e.g., Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 833 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that after a psy-
chiatric patient’s death, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that the state institution 
“was not providing its patients with adequate mental health treatment or medical care”); see 
also Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), State Mental Health Cuts: The Con-
tinuing Crisis 1 (2011), http://www.nami.org/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay. 
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berg standard has become the best shield for plaintiffs against arbitrary 
government decision making. An examination of Lewis and its progeny 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the shocks-the-
conscience standard for substantive due process violations has imposed 
a nearly insurmountable obstacle to holding government officials re-
sponsible for their abuses of power. 
B. Lewis’s Shocks-the-Conscience Standard 
 In Lewis, the Court revisited the meaning of substantive due process 
as a limitation on executive power.164 At issue was the alleged reckless 
conduct of a deputy sheriff who instigated a deadly high-speed chase of 
two boys riding a motorcycle who failed to obey an officer’s command to 
stop.165 Phillip Lewis, the passenger, was struck and killed.166 The Court 
confirmed that substantive due process could be used to challenge 
abuses of executive power, noting that “[s]ince the time of our early ex-
planations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept 
to be protection against arbitrary action.”167 The majority cautioned, 
however, that with regard to specific acts of government officials, only 
the most egregious official action could be considered constitutionally 
arbitrary.168 Invoking Rochin, the Court ruled that only an abuse of pow-
er that “shocks the conscience” will be actionable.169 
 The Lewis Court did not articulate a specific state of mind; rather, it 
explained that what amounts to conscience-shocking conduct depends 
on the circumstances.170 It recognized that “negligently inflicted harm is 
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process,” 
whereas “conduct intended to injure . . . is . . . most likely to rise to the 
conscience-shocking level.”171 The Court then cautioned that a case “fal-
ling within the middle range . . . such as recklessness or gross negli-
                                                                                                                      
cfm?ContentFileID=147763 (reporting deep cuts—$1.6 billion—to state spending on ser-
vices for individuals living with serious mental illness between 2009 and 2011, endangering 
tens of thousands of citizens). The NAMI report further noted that in June 2011, there were 
significant reductions in federal Medicaid rates resulting in a projected loss of $14 billion for 
state Medicaid programs. NAMI, supra, at 4. In addition, 4000 psychiatric hospital beds and 
numerous community service programs have been eliminated since 2010. Id. at 6. 
164 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845–46. 
165 Id. at 836–37. 
166 Id. at 837. 
167 Id. at 845. 
168 Id. at 846. 
169 Id. (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172–73). 
170 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850 (“Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment 
may not be so patently egregious in another . . . .”). 
171 Id. at 849. 
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gence, is a matter for closer calls.”172 It emphasized that “the measure of 
what is conscience shocking is no calibrated yard stick,”173 and that in 
the middle-range cases, courts should engage in an “exact analysis of 
circumstances,” rather than “mechanical application” of predetermined 
rules.174 The Court suggested that in cases where there is time to exer-
cise professional judgment, deliberate indifference would meet the 
standard,175 whereas in emergency situations like the high-speed chase 
at issue, only an intent to harm will be viewed as conscience-shocking.176 
 Despite its recognition of a “fluid” standard for analyzing substan-
tive due process claims,177 the Court acknowledged that it was ratchet-
ing up the standard for when government officials may be held ac-
countable for constitutional wrongdoing, “lest the Constitution be de-
moted to what we have called a font of tort law.”178 Following the 
Court’s lead, the lower federal courts have relied on the loaded shocks-
the-conscience language to deny relief, except in cases involving the 
most egregious violations of civil rights. Some courts have expanded the 
types of cases where intent to harm must be shown,179 whereas others 
have adopted a stringent deliberate indifference test.180 For example, 
detainees bringing substantive due process claims alleging excessive 
force must demonstrate that they have been subjected to “unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.”181 Additionally, students claiming exces-
sive corporal punishment must prove that school officials acted with “in-
tentional malice or sadism” in order to state an actionable claim.182 
                                                                                                                     
 This stringent culpability standard mirrors the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the rights of convicted inmates under the Eighth 
Amendment. In 1994, in Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court held 
that inmates must meet a subjective deliberate indifference test, requir-
 
172 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
173 Id. at 847. 
174 Id. at 850. 
175 Id. at 851–52. 
176 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854–55. 
177 Id. at 850. 
178 Id. at 848 n.8 (explaining that “executive action challenges raise a particular need 
to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional claims”). 
179 Levinson, supra note 153, at 325–27 (noting how many appellate courts have held 
that even where there is time to deliberate, the intent-to-harm standard must be met 
whenever government officials are required to balance difficult competing interests). 
180 Levinson, supra note 126, at 565–79 (discussing student corporal punishment and 
detainee claims where courts have ratcheted up the deliberate indifference test). 
181 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). 
182 Levinson, supra note 153, at 327–28 & nn.121–22 (citing Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 
979, 980–81, 984 (11th Cir. 2009); Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 
F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
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ing proof that a guard actually knew that an inmate faced a substantial 
risk of serious harm and yet acted with deliberate indifference to that 
risk.183 Most circuits have erroneously extended this standard to govern 
substantive due process claims brought by innocent students and de-
tainees not yet convicted of any crime.184 In addition, some federal 
courts have superimposed the shocks-the-conscience standard and its 
baggage on substantive due process claims brought by the civilly com-
mitted.185 
C. Circuit Split on Lewis’s Impact on Youngberg Claims 
 As noted above, the Supreme Court in Youngberg did not mention 
the shocks-the-conscience test.186 Moreover, it specifically rejected the 
use of an Eighth Amendment standard, reasoning that the liberty rights 
of the civilly committed are greater than those of convicted felons.187 
Nonetheless, some appellate courts have ruled that Lewis’s shocks-the-
conscience standard has eclipsed Youngberg’s “substantial-departure-
from-professional-judgment” standard, and that this triggers the Eighth 
Amendment subjective deliberate indifference test.188 Other courts 
have ruled that the shocks-the-conscience standard is no different than 
the Youngberg standard, but in many cases these courts have superim-
posed a stringent state-of-mind requirement that was not part of the 
original Youngberg analysis.189 In many circuits, the decisions reflect a 
distinct move from a pre-Lewis plaintiff-friendly standard to a post-Lewis 
defendant-friendly standard.190 
                                                                                                                      
183 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994). 
184 Levinson, supra note 153, at 325–31 (collecting cases). 
185 See infra notes 191–220 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 191–220 and accompanying text. 
189 See infra notes 191–220 and accompanying text. 
190 Before Lewis, some courts asserted that the state-of-mind requirement for substantive 
due process violations was simply “failure to exercise professional judgment.” See Nielsen v. 
Basit, No. 83 C 1683, 1992 WL 18850, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1992). Others adopted gross 
negligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Dorris v. Cnty. of Washoe, 885 F. 
Supp. 1383, 1386 n.3 (D. Nev. 1995); see also Patten, 274 F.3d at 843–44 (noting the circuit 
split as to what state of mind must accompany the “substantial departure from accepted pro-
fessional judgment,” with the Second and Third Circuits adopting a gross negligence stan-
dard, and the Tenth Circuit mandating proof of deliberate indifference). 
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1. The Transition from Youngberg to Lewis’s Shocks-the-Conscience 
Standard 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has taken the 
most stringent approach to claims brought by the civilly committed, 
ignoring Youngberg and applying Lewis’s shocks-the-conscience test, 
which it equates with the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 
test. For example, in 2004, in Moore ex rel. Moore v. Briggs, the Eighth 
Circuit held that an intellectually disabled resident at a state home 
could not succeed on his substantive due process claim unless he had 
evidence that the defendants actually knew that he faced a substantial 
risk of serious harm and yet disregarded that risk by failing to take ade-
quate measures to protect him.191 The plaintiff alleged that state em-
ployees placed a known pedophile in the facility without sufficiently 
supervising him or providing him with adequate therapy, even after he 
had assaulted another resident.192 Without mentioning Youngberg, the 
court held that the shocks-the-conscience test had to be met and that 
the Lewis Court “equated deliberate indifference for substantive due 
process and Eighth Amendment purposes.”193 It concluded that “the 
record [was] devoid of evidence showing the subjective recklessness 
required to prove deliberate indifference.”194 A few months earlier, an-
other Eighth Circuit panel cited Youngberg as having established “an 
affirmative duty to undertake some responsibility for providing [the 
patient] with a reasonably safe environment,” but it also superimposed 
Lewis’s threshold requirement that the state actors must have engaged 
in conscience-shocking behavior.195 
 Before Lewis, the Seventh Circuit vociferously rejected the use of 
the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test in the civil com-
                                                                                                                      
191 Moore ex rel. Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Elizabeth 
M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a patient involuntarily 
confined in a state mental health facility must prove that state officials were deliberately 
indifferent to a known excessive risk to patient safety). The Eighth Circuit has also held 
that Youngberg should not apply to civilly committed patients who challenge the adequacy 
of their treatment, rejecting the position of many circuits that have interpreted Youngberg 
to require at least minimally adequate treatment. See Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 557–
58 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 124 (2012). 
192 Moore, 381 F.3d at 773–74. 
193 Id. at 774 (citation omitted). As discussed in Part IV, this opinion misreads Lewis, 
which cited the Eighth Amendment test as only one of several ways to satisfy the shocks-
the-conscience standard, depending on the specific context in which the claim arises. See 
infra notes 241–293 and accompanying text. 
194 Moore, 381 F.3d at 774. 
195 Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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mitment context.196 Some recent Seventh Circuit decisions, however, 
embrace this standard. Thus, an involuntarily civilly committed repeat 
sex offender who challenged the conditions of his confinement was 
required to meet the Eighth Amendment standard, namely Farmer’s 
subjective deliberate indifference test.197 The court asserted that in the 
context of medical professionals, the subjective deliberate indifference 
test has been described as the “professional judgment” standard, but 
that both standards were the same.198 
 In a 1998 decision, the Seventh Circuit explained in greater detail 
why the Youngberg and Eighth Amendment standards were equiva-
lent.199 Although acknowledging that “the professional judgment stan-
dard . . . is at least as demanding as the Eighth Amendment ‘deliberate 
indifference’ standard,” the court rejected the notion that it was more 
demanding.200 The court conceded that the Eighth Amendment sub-
jective deliberate indifference standard is used to determine whether 
conduct amounts to unlawful punishment for convicted persons, but it 
reasoned that “there is minimal difference in what the two standards 
require of state actors,” because “[o]nly the criminal recklessness stan-
dard provides adequate notice of what conduct is or is not permit-
ted.”201 In short, for a civilly committed patient to show that a state ac-
tor’s decision was a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, the plaintiff must show that the professional knew about a 
serious medical need and subsequently disregarded that need.202 
                                                                                                                      
 
196 See Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1994) (asserting 
that the application of the deliberate indifference test to involuntarily committed patients 
“would undermine the Court’s pronouncement that involuntarily committed patients are 
entitled to more protected ‘conditions of confinement’ than convicted criminals”). 
197 Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). 
198 Id. at 894–95 (“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be 
held to have displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision [meets the Youngberg 
standard].” (internal quotation mark and citation omitted)). Ultimately, the court con-
cluded that the district court erred in denying summary judgment for the defense because 
the doctor’s decisions were not “based on a professional judgment” that “amounted to 
deliberate indifference.” Id. at 896. 
199 Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998). 
200 Id. (citation omitted). 
201 Id. at 989. 
202 Id.; cf. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that al-
though pretrial detainees must meet an Eighth Amendment criminal recklessness stan-
dard to prove that nonmedical staff acted with deliberate indifference regarding an al-
leged denial of medical treatment, deliberate indifference on the part of medical staff may 
be inferred when the medical professional’s decision is “such a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment . . . as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not 
base the decision on such a judgment” (quoting Estate of Cole ex rel. Pardue v. Fromm, 94 
F.3d 254, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1996)); West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745, 748–49 (7th Cir. 2003) 
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 Cases in the Eleventh Circuit reflect the same transition from the 
Youngberg professional judgment standard to the subjective deliberate 
indifference test of the Eighth Amendment.203 Thus, in 2006, in Laven-
der v. Kearney,204 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “the due process 
rights of the involuntarily civilly committed are at least as extensive as 
the Eighth Amendment rights of the criminally institutionalized” and 
concluded that: 
[R]elevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context also 
serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of 
the civilly committed. Accordingly, for an involuntarily civilly-
committed plaintiff to establish a § 1983 claim for violation of 
his due process rights, he must show that state officials were 
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to his safety.205 
 The First Circuit has similarly reasoned that the two standards are 
“not all that far apart.”206 In 2011, in Battista v. Clarke, the First Circuit 
explained that “[b]oth the Farmer and Youngberg tests leave ample room 
for professional judgment, constraints presented by the institutional 
setting, and the need to give latitude to administrators who have to 
make difficult trade-offs as to risks and resources.”207 In reviewing the 
approaches of other circuits on this question, the court noted that the 
Tenth Circuit also applies the deliberate indifference test regarding 
medical care for the civilly committed without even mentioning Young-
berg,208 whereas the Fourth Circuit applies the professional judgment 
                                                                                                                      
 
(holding that involuntarily committed sex offenders are entitled to have their needs as-
sessed based on the exercise of professional judgment and questioning whether seclusion 
for twenty or more consecutive days could be justified on treatment or security grounds). 
203 See Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “Young-
berg recognized that patients involuntarily committed to state custody enjoy a substantive due 
process right to reasonable care and safety . . . . [but] courts were instructed only to make 
certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised, not to second-guess the outcome of 
that judgment” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 
F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 2000) (debating who constitutes a “professional” decisionmaker and 
citing Youngberg as the governing standard for those who fit within the definition). 
204 Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2006). 
205 Id. at 863 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also A.P. ex rel. Baz-
erman v. Feaver, 293 F. App’x 635, 651, 653 (11th Cir. 2008) (adopting the deliberate indif-
ference standard in the context of children in foster care, and explaining that “in order to 
establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had (1) subjec-
tive knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, and yet (2) disregarded that risk”). 
206 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011). 
207 Id. 
208 See id. at 453 n.4 (citing Ketchum v. Marshall, 963 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpub-
lished table decision)). The Tenth Circuit earlier reasoned that, because of the ambiguity 
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test, not deliberate indifference,209 and the Seventh Circuit has basi-
cally ruled that the two standards are equivalent.210 
                                                                                                                     
 Battista involved a civilly committed, anatomically male patient suf-
fering from gender identity disorder who was denied hormone therapy 
despite the recommendation of health care professionals that this 
treatment was medically necessary.211 Sandy Battista had sought to cas-
trate herself with a razor after having been refused hormones for sev-
eral years.212 Ultimately, the court ruled that because Battista’s substan-
tive due process claims met both the Youngberg and Farmer standards, it 
did not have to decide whether, under Youngberg, “civilly committed 
persons are entitled to an extra margin of protection.”213 Notably, the 
First Circuit had broadly proclaimed ten years earlier that a failure to 
protect patients from harm violates substantive due process under the 
Youngberg standard, even if the failure does not shock the conscience.214 
The First Circuit changed course in 2010, holding that, even if De-
Shaney’s special relationship standard is met, plaintiffs must additionally 
establish that the official misconduct rose to a conscience-shocking 
level, which requires “stunning evidence of arbitrariness and ca-
price.”215 
 
surrounding the content of both the deliberate indifference and professional judgment 
standards, there may not, as a practical matter, be much difference between the two. 
Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In Yvonne L., involving the rights of foster children, the court ultimately adopted the pro-
fessional judgment standard rather than the deliberate indifference standard, reasoning 
that “foster children, like involuntarily committed patients, are ‘entitled to more consider-
ate treatment and conditions’ than criminals.” Id. (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22); 
cf. Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir. 2003) (reciting Youngberg’s 
holding that “[s]tates must ensure reasonable care and safety to persons within their cus-
tody,” including children in foster care, but nevertheless asserting that “the state may be 
liable when a state actor shows deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a child 
who is in state custody” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); James v. Grand 
Lake Mental Health Ctr. Inc., 161 F.3d 17, *10 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table deci-
sion) (holding that substantive due process claims against doctors at a state hospital failed 
because the doctors’ decisions, which lacked a strong medical basis, did not rise to Lewis’s 
shocks-the-conscience standard). 
209 See Battista, 645 F.3d at 453 n.4 (citing Patten, 274 F.3d at 833–42). 
210 See id. (citing Sain, 512 F.3d at 894–95; Ambrose v. Puckett, 198 F. App’x 537, 539–
40 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
211 Id. at 450–51. 
212 Id. at 450. 
213 Id. at 453–55. 
214 Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2001). 
215 J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(noting that such a showing requires that officials were aware of a danger that they chose 
to ignore). 
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 The Third Circuit has also fully embraced Lewis’s shocks-the-
conscience standard. In Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., decided in 
2004, the Third Circuit addressed whether physicians in a state psychi-
atric facility could be held liable for failing to protect a resident from 
committing suicide.216 The court explained that the failure could not 
be considered conscience-shocking “where the decision is a product of 
the authorities’ professional judgment.”217 This statement could imply 
that when decisions do fail the professional judgment standard, they 
meet the Lewis test. The court emphasized, however, that the “threshold 
question” is whether the behavior is so egregious that it shocks the con-
science.218 Thus, even if a professional decision falls substantially below 
medical standards, it will not be found to violate substantive due proc-
ess unless it is also “conscience-shocking.”219 Notably, in earlier rulings, 
the Third Circuit followed the Youngberg test, not a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard, in assessing failure-to-protect, excessive restraint, and 
failure-to-habilitate claims brought by institutionalized persons with 
intellectual disabilities.220 
2. A More Plaintiff-Friendly Approach in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits 
 In contrast to the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits, other appellate courts have taken a more plaintiff-
friendly approach. For example, in 2010 in Bolmer v. Oliveira, the Sec-
ond Circuit resolved the conflict by concluding that whenever state 
personnel violate the Youngberg standard, the conduct should automati-
cally be deemed conscience-shocking.221 Thus, in the Second Circuit, a 
psychiatrist’s decision to have a patient involuntarily committed will be 
found to shock the conscience if it falls substantially below standards 
                                                                                                                      
216 Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004). 
217 Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
218 Id. at 174. 
219 Id. at 175. 
220 See Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1139, 1150 (3d Cir. 1990) (rea-
soning that the plaintiff’s burden is greater “when trying to show deliberate indifference 
than when trying to establish a failure to exercise professional judgment,” and that the 
Youngberg standard “should have been applied to the primary care professionals, supervi-
sors and administrators named as defendants”); see also Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 
468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that “[t]o apply the Eighth Amendment standard to men-
tally retarded persons would be little short of barbarous”). 
221 See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Blum, supra note 
119, at 479 (“Conduct by professionals that represents a significant departure from ac-
cepted professional practice and that causes constitutional injury to those entrusted in 
their care should meet the shocks-the-conscience standard of the court.”). 
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generally accepted in the medical community.222 In Bolmer, it was un-
necessary for the court to determine separately whether the conduct 
shocked the conscience under Lewis.223 The court reasoned that the 
professional judgment standard “imposes liability for conduct that is at 
least grossly negligent,” and that “Lewis does not preclude liability for 
such middle-range culpability.”224 Notably, the Second Circuit applied 
an objective medical standards analysis, explaining that the court does 
not read Lewis as requiring a subjective analysis of the professional’s 
state of mind.225 
 Similarly, in 2001 in Patten v. Nichols, the Fourth Circuit flatly re-
jected the defense’s argument that government officials could not be 
held liable for the death of a psychiatric patient absent proof of delib-
erate indifference regarding the denial of medical care.226 Rather, 
Youngberg’s professional judgment test applied, which the court ac-
knowledged is much more protective than the Eighth Amendment de-
liberate indifference test.227 The court recognized that the same “de-
nial of medical care” substantive due process claim is analyzed under a 
subjective deliberate indifference test when brought by pretrial detain-
ees.228 It reasoned, however, that a different culpability standard was 
justified because pretrial detainees are sufficiently different from the 
civilly committed in terms of why they are in custody, where they are 
held and by whom, and how long they will be confined.229 
 The Sixth Circuit has also ruled that Youngberg, not the deliberate 
indifference test, governs claims brought by a psychiatric patient against 
professional employees of a state facility.230 Like the Fourth Circuit, the 
Sixth Circuit has recognized that those involuntarily committed as psy-
chiatric patients have greater substantive due process rights than in-
                                                                                                                      
222 See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 144–45. 
223 Id. at 143. 
224 Id. at 144 (citation omitted). 
225 Id. at 145. 
226 Patten, 274 F.3d at 833–42. 
227 Id. at 836–37; cf. Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., 528 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]here the state is in a special relationship to a private individual, it acquires a duty to 
act on that individual’s behalf and its failures to act are measured on a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard . . . .”). 
228 Patten, 274 F.3d at 837. 
229 Id. at 840–41. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit determined that the treatment deci-
sions of hospital personnel “exhibited both professional concern and judgment and there-
fore were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Youngberg.” Id. at 844. 
230 Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008). The court held, however, that 
plaintiffs who sue nonprofessional staff must prove they “knew of and disregarded an ex-
cessive risk to [the patient’s] health or safety.” Id.; see also infra note 282 and accompanying 
text (discussing this aspect of the case). 
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mates or pretrial detainees, and that, although a court must balance 
competing concerns, it must make certain that professional judgment 
was exercised.231 Thus, a district court inappropriately granted summary 
judgment where fact issues remained as to whether the actions and inac-
tions of medical professionals at a psychiatric hospital where mental pa-
tients died in large numbers actually reflected professional judgment.232 
 The Ninth Circuit has most consistently held that Youngberg’s more 
protective standard survived Lewis. In 2011, in Ammons v. Washington 
Department of Social and Health Services, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that a staff member at a residential psychiatric hospital had sexual rela-
tions with a severely emotionally disturbed fourteen-year-old.233 The 
court reasoned that Youngberg conferred an affirmative right to rea-
sonably safe conditions, and that a reasonable hospital official would 
have taken steps to ensure close supervision of a staff member previ-
ously accused of inappropriate behavior toward patients.234 The court 
emphasized that Youngberg imposes a conscious indifference, not an 
Eighth Amendment criminal recklessness, standard that requires plain-
tiffs to show that officials were “subjectively aware of the risk.”235 The 
court explained why this would be contrary to Youngberg’s objective 
standard: “Regardless of whether [the defendant] was subjectively 
aware of these signals, a jury could conclude that a reasonable hospital 
administrator in [the defendant’s] position of authority . . . would have 
taken steps to become aware of what was happening . . . .”236 
                                                                                                                      
231 See Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 848–50 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
232 Id.; see also Neiberger v. Hawkins, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148–49, 1151 (D. Colo. 
2002) (applying Youngberg’s professional judgment standard to the superintendent of a 
mental health facility when criminally insane patients, who were involuntarily committed, 
alleged that they were denied adequate medical and psychiatric care). 
233 Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2379 (2012). 
234 See id. at 1032–33. 
235 Id. at 1029. 
236 Id. at 1033. The Ammons dissent argued that Youngberg requires only that profes-
sional judgment be exercised and that the majority gave insufficient deference to Young-
berg’s presumption of correctness. Id. at 1038 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“[L]iability may be 
imposed only when the decision . . . is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment . . . as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base 
the decision on such a judgment.” (alteration in original) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
323)); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that the 
rights of a sexually violent predator who was civilly committed following a criminal sen-
tence may differ from the rights of a plaintiff who was civilly committed because of mental 
infirmities, because the former “ha[s] been adjudged to pose a danger to the health and 
safety of others”), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). 
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 To summarize, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits re-
main the most protective of the rights of the civilly committed, holding 
that government decisions that substantially depart from professional 
judgment violate substantive due process.237 Significantly, all these 
courts have rejected the Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indif-
ference standard.238 In sharp contrast, the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have significantly ratcheted up the culpa-
bility standard by equating Youngberg with the shocks-the-conscience 
standard or Farmer deliberate indifference test.239 The decisions dem-
onstrate that when courts follow the Youngberg standard, without impos-
ing the shocks-the-conscience standard as an additional or substitute 
test, plaintiffs are more likely to win their cases, or at least to survive 
summary judgment.240 
IV. Reconciling the Shocks-the-Conscience Standard  
with Youngberg 
 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement in Lewis, 
that the shocks-the-conscience test should govern all substantive due 
process challenges to official misconduct, a close reading of the opin-
ion demonstrates that it was not intended to affect the substantive due 
process analysis recognized in the Court’s 1982 decision in Youngberg.241 
The Lewis Court admonished that no single liability standard could be 
articulated because conscience-shocking conduct depends on the cir-
cumstances.242 In fact, to demonstrate the flexibility of substantive due 
process’s culpability standard, the majority cited Youngberg as having 
recognized that, in the context of civil commitment, substantive due 
process is violated when state personnel fail to exercise professional 
judgment.243 In light of this apparent reaffirmation of the Youngberg 
standard, the argument that Lewis displaced or weakened the protec-
tion of the rights of civilly committed is fatuous. 
                                                                                                                      
237 See supra notes 221–236 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 221–236 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 191–220 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra notes 221–236 and accompanying text. 
241 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852 (1998); Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 324–25 (1982). 
242 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850; supra notes 170–176 and accompanying text. 
243 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12; see also Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 142–44 (2d Cir. 
2010) (arguing that Lewis did not preclude liability for mid-range grossly negligent con-
duct that satisfies the shocks-the-conscience standard). 
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 Further, those courts that have equated the professional judgment 
standard with the Eighth Amendment’s criminal recklessness standard 
have ignored Youngberg’s core holding that the rights of the involuntar-
ily committed are greater than the rights of convicted inmates.244 The 
Court in Youngberg carefully balanced the liberty interests of patients 
and residents against the government’s interest in institutional security 
and the safety of those housed in a facility.245 That balance resulted in 
the Youngberg standard, requiring that professional judgment be exer-
cised.246 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis and its imposition 
of a shocks-the-conscience standard should not be read to displace or 
ratchet up Youngberg’s culpability test. 
A. The Culpability Conundrum 
 Much of the confusion in the circuits stems from conflating broad 
culpability standards with specific state-of-mind prerequisites. In adopt-
ing Youngberg’s professional judgment standard, the Supreme Court did 
not articulate any particular state of mind.247 Further, in assessing 
whether challenged conduct shocks the conscience, the Lewis Court 
reasoned that the requisite state of mind depends on the context.248 
Youngberg’s “substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment” test implies an objective inquiry into prevailing medical stan-
dards and whether a reasonable professional, applying those standards, 
would have made the same decision in light of the particular facts in a 
case.249 It is not necessary to prove that the professional actually knew 
that her conduct violated accepted professional standards or that she 
intended to deviate from these standards. 
 Because the Youngberg Court mandated a “substantial” departure 
from accepted professional judgment, most courts have recognized that 
there must be proof that the challenged decision demonstrated more 
than mere negligence.250 Further, in 1986, in Daniels v. Williams, the 
Supreme Court ruled that all substantive due process claims must be 
                                                                                                                      
244 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324–25. 
245 See id. at 319–22. 
246 See id. at 321. 
247 See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text. 
249 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. 
250 See Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 843 (4th Cir. 2001); supra notes 186–240 and ac-
companying text. 
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based on something more than mere negligence.251 But before Lewis, 
the lower courts were divided as to whether the substantial departure 
from professional judgment standard required a showing of gross neg-
ligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference.252 The appellate courts 
unanimously agreed, however, that the Eighth Amendment subjective 
deliberate indifference standard does not govern253 because the Su-
preme Court in Youngberg specifically condemned that standard.254 
 Several appellate court decisions initially tracked Youngberg’s clear 
rejection of the Eighth Amendment standard. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in 1994 ruled that application of the sub-
jective deliberate indifference standard to cases involving involuntarily 
committed patients conflicted with the Youngberg Court’s determination 
that the civilly committed receive greater protections than convicted 
criminals.255 The Third Circuit agreed, focusing particularly on the 
treatment of institutionalized, intellectually disabled individuals.256 The 
Eighth Amendment’s requirement that officials actually know that in-
mates face a serious risk of harm provides insufficient protection to the 
civilly committed. As one federal district court judge explained: 
[P]laintiffs in making out a claim of constitutional violation 
can employ evidence of misconduct which is not predicated 
on actual knowledge of harm or risk. To do otherwise would 
be to endorse neglect by government officials in the care of 
institutionalized and foster children. Indeed, to allow officials 
                                                                                                                      
251 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332–33 (1986). The Daniels Court confirmed that 
the Due Process Clause was not meant to protect against harm negligently inflicted, but it 
expressly left open “whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness 
or ‘gross negligence,’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. 
at 334 n.3; see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is cate-
gorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”). 
252 See supra note 190; see also Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“Professional judgment, like recklessness and gross negligence, generally falls 
somewhere between simple negligence and intentional misconduct.”); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he [Youngberg] Court adopted what is 
essentially a gross negligence standard.”); cf. Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Hu-
man Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992) (doubting whether “there is much differ-
ence” between the deliberate indifference standard and the Youngberg standard). 
253 See supra notes 186–240 and accompanying text; infra notes 255–268 and accompa-
nying text. 
254 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 325 (“[W]e conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed 
on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amend-
ment.”). 
255 Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1994). 
256 See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987) (“To apply the Eighth 
Amendment standard to mentally retarded persons would be little short of barbarous.”). 
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entrusted with these responsibilities to neglect their duties 
with impunity would stand the professional judgment stan-
dard on its head by placing the officials in a better position if 
they could claim “I didn’t read the report” or “I didn’t return 
phone calls”, than if they explained that “I read the report 
and kept in contact with my charges, and I made this decision 
because . . .”.257 
 Despite courts’ application of an Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference standard to pretrial detainees, at least one defendant has 
challenged the anomaly of applying Youngberg’s professional judgment 
standard to civilly committed patients who are claiming identical con-
stitutional rights violations.258 In response, the Fourth Circuit persua-
sively articulated why Youngberg, and not the Eighth Amendment, stan-
dard should govern.259 First, the court explained that those in the 
state’s custody due to mental incapacity are there to be given appropri-
ate care and treatment, whereas a pretrial detainee is taken into cus-
tody “because the state believes the detainee has committed a 
crime.”260 Second, the court reasoned that although pretrial detainees 
are housed in jails or prisons that law enforcement officials supervise, 
patients are generally housed in hospitals that medical professionals 
staff.261 Further, whereas most pretrial detainees face a relatively short 
period of confinement until their charges are resolved or they are re-
leased on bond, those committed to state institutions for mental inca-
pacity often face “lengthy and even lifelong confinement.”262 In short, 
“The differences in the purposes for which the groups are confined 
and the nature of the confinement itself are more than enough to war-
rant treating their . . . claims under different standards.”263 
                                                                                                                     
 The Supreme Court’s admonition in Lewis that substantive due 
process is a flexible standard dependent on all the surrounding cir-
cumstances buttresses the rejection of the Eighth Amendment stan-
dard.264 The core holding in Youngberg is that the decisions and actions 
of professionals must exhibit professional concern and judgment.265 
 
257 Wendy H. ex rel. Smith v. City of Phila., 849 F. Supp. 367, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
258 See Patten, 274 F.3d at 840–41. 
259 See id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 841. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. 
265 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. 
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Romeo’s mother sued the hospital administrators on the theory that 
they failed to institute appropriate procedures to protect her son from 
injuries they “knew, or should have known” Romeo was receiving.266 As 
the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Youngberg . . . created a standard 
whereby whether a hospital administrator has violated a patient’s con-
stitutional rights is determined by whether the administrator’s conduct 
diverges from that of a reasonable professional.”267 Further, the Lewis 
Court cited Youngberg’s professional judgment standard approvingly, 
explaining that “[t]he combination of a patient’s involuntary commit-
ment and his total dependence on his custodians” mandates the state 
to reasonably provide for the patient’s welfare.268 
 The importance of adhering to the Youngberg standard is particu-
larly critical in the context of decisions that budgetary constraints in-
fluence, which in many cases may be the real cause for the substantive 
due process violation.269 Decisions based on fiscal constraints might not 
be “conscience-shocking” in the post-Lewis sense that malice or ill will 
toward patients inspire them.270 On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court in Youngberg reasoned that, although fiscal constraints could insu-
late individuals from personal liability under a qualified immunity the-
ory, the institution itself could be subject to injunctive relief to address 
the conditions that gave rise to the constitutional rights violation.271 In 
fact, relying on Youngberg, some lower courts have ruled that decisions 
driven by purely budgetary concerns are not insulated by the profes-
sional judgment standard and may violate substantive due process.272 
                                                                                                                      
266 Id. at 310. 
267 Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2379 (2012). 
268 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12. 
269 See Parry, supra note 92, at 320 (arguing that “our society has not provided the 
money, resources, and sustained attention necessary to make [the] care [of persons with 
mental illness] . . . a compelling financial and programmatic priority”). 
270 See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text. 
271 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22. 
272 See, e.g., Kirsch v. Thompson, 717 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (explaining that 
the decision of a professional must be based on medical or psychological criteria, rather than 
nonmedical or administrative criteria); Baldridge v. Clinton, 674 F. Supp. 665, 670 (E.D. Ark. 
1987) (concluding that a professional must determine what is appropriate care based not 
upon what resources are available, but rather upon medical or psychological criteria); Clark 
v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that professional judgment must be 
“based on medical or psychological criteria and not on exigency, administrative convenience, 
or other non-medical criteria”), aff’d, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Frederick L. v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that one’s “substantive 
liberty interest encompasses the right to treatment consistent with the judgment of qualified 
professionals . . . not affected by funding issues”). 
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 A key concern in Youngberg was the need for “uniformity in pro-
tecting these [liberty] interests.”273 If budgetary considerations can in-
sulate defendants from substantive due process liability, the rights of 
those committed in civil institutions would depend on how state legisla-
tures decide to fund mental health services. In particular, in light of 
shrinking budgets and shortfalls, such a standard would violate the 
Youngberg Court’s core concern that decisions be based on professional 
judgment.274 State professionals obviously cannot act as if they had un-
limited resources, but the courts should ensure that balancing fiscal 
interests against an individual’s right to treatment reflects how profes-
sionals would act in the private sphere—rejecting treatment choices 
that are exorbitantly expensive, or of questionable value, would meet 
an objective professional judgment standard. For example, in Jackson v. 
Fort Stanton Hospital & Training School, decided in 1992, the Tenth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that the professional judgment standard does not 
preclude consideration of resources in considering constitutionally ac-
ceptable alternatives.275 Nevertheless, the court also recognized that, by 
imposing overly extensive cost restrictions in individual cases, a state 
could so limit the range of treatment recommendations available to 
professionals that their judgment would be rendered inadequate to 
meet constitutional standards.276 
B. Challenging the Conduct of Nonprofessionals 
 One final point deserves discussion. Youngberg addressed the situa-
tion where decisions made by professionals are challenged as a viola-
tion of substantive due process.277 Justice Lewis Powell defined a “pro-
fessional” as “a person competent, whether by education, training or 
experience, to make the particular decision at issue.”278 The Court dis-
tinguished between “persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or 
with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, 
or the care and training of the retarded,” who would be responsible for 
                                                                                                                      
273 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. 
274 See id. at 324; see also supra note 163 (discussing data revealing drastic cuts in state 
mental health budgets since 2009). 
275 Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 991–92 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
276 Id. 
277 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22. 
278 Id. at 323 n.30; see also Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“What is implicit in Youngberg is that the alleged constitutional violation is related to some 
aspect of the treatment decision made by a professional decision maker.”). 
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“[l]ong-term treatment decisions,” and “employees without formal 
training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons,” 
and who would make “day-to-day decisions regarding care.”279 The 
Court did not address how to adjudicate substantive due process claims 
against nonprofessionals.280 The presumption of validity and the need 
to defer to experts recognized in Youngberg is required only when pro-
fessionals make decisions.281 This would suggest that when nonprofes-
sionals are charged with violating the substantive due process rights of 
the civilly committed, a different, but nonetheless rigorous, standard 
should apply. Nevertheless, those appellate courts that have recognized 
the professional/nonprofessional distinction have proceeded to invoke 
the Eighth Amendment’s criminal recklessness standard.282 
 The proper analysis must start with the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Lewis that the government officials’ action, or failure to act, violates 
substantive due process only if the conduct “shocks the conscience.”283 
The Supreme Court in Lewis mandated that, except in the context of a 
high-speed chase or emergency situation where an intent to harm must 
be shown, plaintiffs must satisfy a deliberate indifference test to hold a 
wrongdoer accountable.284 Unfortunately, the Lewis Court did not iden-
tify whether it was imposing a subjective or objective deliberate indif-
ference test, and the majority of circuits have adopted the Eighth 
Amendment subjective deliberate indifference standard, which man-
dates a showing of criminal recklessness—the defendant must have ac-
                                                                                                                      
279 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 n.30. 
280 See id. at 323 & n.30. 
281 See id. 
282 See, e.g., King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2012) (reasoning in the 
context of the death of a pretrial detainee that the nonmedical defendants could not be 
held accountable absent evidence that they were actually aware of an objectively serious 
medical need and were deliberately indifferent to it, whereas a “medical professional’s 
deliberate indifference may be inferred” when the decision substantially departs “from 
accepted professional judgment”); Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(reasoning that the subjective deliberate indifference standard should be applied to the 
conduct of resident care aides sued for allegedly violating the substantive due process 
rights of a patient who died in a psychiatric hospital); Shaw, 920 F.2d at 1147 (holding that 
defendant residential service aides, charged with failing to protect a profoundly intellectu-
ally disabled resident in a state institution from abuse and sexual assault, were nonprofes-
sional employees subject to a deliberate indifference standard rather than the Youngberg 
standard); Clark v. Donahue, 885 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (“Where the hospi-
tal employee is in no way a trained professional, either administratively or medically, there 
is no professional judgment to evaluate. . . . Therefore, [his or her] actions are subject to 
the deliberate indifference standard.” (citation omitted)). 
283 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. 
284 Id. at 851–54. 
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tual knowledge that an inmate faced a risk of serious harm and yet ex-
hibited deliberate indifference to that risk.285 Under this “subjective 
recklessness” standard, officials will escape liability even when they 
“fail[ ] to alleviate a significant risk that [they] should have perceived 
but did not.”286 As discussed, the federal appellate courts have applied 
this standard to substantive due process claims brought by pretrial de-
tainees, despite the Supreme Court’s admonition that, unlike convicted 
felons who are protected only from “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
pretrial detainees cannot be constitutionally subjected to punishment 
in any manner.287 
 These decisions are wrong for pretrial detainees and even less justi-
fied with regard to the rights of the civilly committed.288 Youngberg clear-
ly held that those who are civilly committed are entitled to greater rights 
than convicted felons.289 The Court determined that some leeway must 
be given to professionals who render decisions that impair substantive 
due process rights.290 Yet, when nonprofessionals violate a patient’s lib-
erty interests, there is no justification for deference.291 Therefore, courts 
should impose an objective deliberate indifference standard, examining 
whether reasonable government officials would have recognized that 
the challenged conduct impaired a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest. Although the Supreme Court in Youngberg recognized that pa-
tients’ rights must be balanced against institutional needs, courts should 
not equate the substantive due process rights of those civilly committed 
in state institutions to the rights of those who have been charged with or 
convicted of criminal offenses. Finally, it should be emphasized that 
hospital professionals may be held accountable for their own failure to 
manage, supervise, or discipline the nonprofessionals who engage in 
constitutional wrongdoing. In Youngberg, it was the failure of supervisory 
                                                                                                                      
285 See supra notes 177–185 and accompanying text (describing the stringent deliberate 
indifference standard). 
286 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). 
287 In 1979, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, the Supreme Court reasoned that “if a re-
striction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or pur-
poseless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the government action is pun-
ishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” See also City 
of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (reasoning that where there has been 
no “formal adjudication of guilt . . . the Eighth Amendment has no application”). 
288 See supra notes 258–268 and accompanying text (discussing Patten v. Nichols and the 
arguments as to why the rights of pretrial detainees should not be equated with the rights 
of the civilly committed). 
289 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
290 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 325. 
291 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
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officials to institute appropriate procedures that gave rise to liability un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment.292 This decision thus provides guid-
ance for adjudicating supervisory liability claims.293 
Conclusion 
 Youngberg’s professional judgment standard should govern substan-
tive due process claims brought by those civilly committed to a state in-
stitution, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.294 The Youngberg standard 
provides an objective test that carefully balances the competing con-
cerns of personal liberty and institutional security. In sharp contrast, 
Lewis’s shocks-the-conscience test is inherently subjective, and the 
charged language has led most appellate courts to treat the rights of the 
civilly committed no differently than those of convicted felons.295 The 
Supreme Court in Lewis did not overturn Youngberg—rather, it cited 
Youngberg as persuasive authority—and thus the two decisions need not 
be reconciled.296 Finally, for substantive due process claims against non-
professionals, an objective deliberate indifference, rather than a subjec-
tive Eighth Amendment criminal recklessness, standard should govern. 
As Justice Harry Blackmun poignantly acknowledged: 
[O]ur Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more 
broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to 
read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympa-
thetic” reading, one which comports with dictates of funda-
mental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be 
exiled from the province of judging.297 
 
292 Id. at 323 n.30, 324. 
293 The question of supervisory liability, particularly in the wake of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009), is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Disci-
pline Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 273 (2012) 
(providing guidance on how to establish supervisory liability in light of the Court’s hold-
ing in Iqbal that supervisors may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents). 
294 See supra notes 91–143 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 186–240 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 247–276 and accompanying text. 
297 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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